I revisit the popular concern over a nonlinearity or threshold in the relationship between public debt and growth employing long time series data from up to 27 countries. My empirical approach recognises that standard time series arguments for long-run equilibrium relations between integrated variables (cointegration) break down in nonlinear specifications such as those predominantly applied in the existing debt-growth literature. Adopting the novel co-summability approach my analysis overcomes these difficulties to find no evidence for a systematic long-run relationship between debt and growth in the bivariate and economic theory-based multivariate specifications popular in this literature.
Introduction
"The latest research [by Reinhart and Rogoff] suggests that once debt reaches more than about 90% of GDP the risks of a large negative impact on long term growth become highly significant." George Osborne, Mais Lecture, February 24, 2010 "The study [Reinhart and Rogoff (2010b) ] found conclusive empirical evidence that total debt exceeding 90 percent of the economy has a significant negative effect on economic growth."
'The Path to Prosperity,' House Committee on the Budget, April 5, 2011 Despite the rhetoric adopted by a number of governments and opposition parties over recent years, determining a causal link from public debt to long-run growth as well as the potential nonlinearity of this relationship are widely regarded as unresolved empirical issues (International Monetary Fund, 2012; Panizza and Presbitero, 2013) . As above quotes indicate the most influential research on the debt-growth nexus in recent years is unarguably the work by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010b) which has been adopted as justification for fiscal austerity measures by politicians on both sides of the Atlantic. Although recent revelations challenged the descriptive analysis carried out in their paper, Reinhart and Rogoff maintain that "the weight of the evidence to date -including this latest comment [by Herndon, Ash and Pollin (2014) ] -seems entirely consistent with our original interpretation of the data" (Wall Street Journal 'Real Time Economics' blog, April 16, 2013) , namely that "high debt/GDP levels (90 percent and above) are associated with notably lower growth outcomes" (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010b, p.577 ; see also Rogoff, 2013) . Perhaps aware of the tension between the causal interpretation typically read into this type of statement and the descriptive nature of their analysis, some of their earlier work (Reinhart, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2012 ) already pointed to a set of empirical studies which are argued to address both concerns regarding causality and identification of a nonlinearity in the long-run debt-growth relationship (e.g. Kumar and Woo, 2010; Balassone, Francese and Pace, 2011; Cecchetti, Mohanty and Zampolli, 2011; Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2012) 1 in support of their findings. This paper investigates the debt-growth nexus from a new angle and with a somewhat more modest aim, focusing on the persistence of the long time series data used in the original Reinhart and Rogoff (2010b) study. I adopt annual data for over two centuries to investigate whether linear or various nonlinear specifications of the debt-growth nexus constitute 'long-run equilibrium relations' in four OECD countries: the United States, Great Britain, Japan and Sweden; 2 additional work presented in an Online Appendix extends the analysis to 27 advanced and developing economies. The analysis employs the most popular specifications in this empirical literature -polynomial functions and piecewise linear (threshold) specifications -to model the hypothesised nonlinearity. The basic premise of my analysis is that if variable series are integrated (nonstationary), then the popular implementations of nonlinearity in the debt-growth literature (squared debt terms or debt terms interacted with threshold dummies) are invalid, since these transformations of the variable are not defined within the (co-)integration framework. Therefore any empirical results building on these polynomial or threshold specifications may be spurious.
My empirical strategy addresses this problem by adopting novel methods for summability and cosummability testing (Berenguer-Rico and Gonzalo, 2014a,b) . These concepts provide a framework encompassing integration and cointegration which however extends to non-linear relationships.
The analysis in this study is thus (narrowly) focused on the question of potential nonlinearities in the long-run debt-growth relationship, bypassing any concerns over the direction of causation which does not impact the statistical validity of the results. If there is no evidence for (nonlinear) long-run relations, then standard empirical specifications in the literature adopting thresholds or polynomial functions are misspecified and the causal interpretation assigned in these studies is questionable: the presence of a long-run equilibrium is a pre-requisite for the existence of any long-run causal relationship in the data. Results have important policy implications given that the most vocal supporters of fiscal austerity have pointed to the above-cited studies as providing empirically sound evidence for (this type of) nonlinearities in the debt-growth relationship.
The primary empirical focus is to investigate data for debt and GDP in Great Britain, Japan, Sweden and the United States over the 1800-2010 time horizon. In additional analysis I investigate My core analysis finds no evidence for any long-run relationship between debt and growth in the linear or nonlinear specifications for the four countries investigated. Subsample analysis does not fundamentally challenge this finding although it provides an indication that there may have been long-run relationships between debt and growth at different points in time, although not in the post-WWII period typically studied in the existing literature. The general patterns revealed by the subsample analysis supports the notion that the debt-growth relationship differs across countries and "with economic circumstances" (Larry Summers, Witness Statement to the US Senate Budget Committee, June 4, 2013). Additional empirical analysis goes to great lengths to determine whether the choice of countries, time periods, and/or atheoretical specifications drive this finding but arrives at a fairly consistent picture across all different modes of investigation. These findings help challenge the apparent consensus in parts of the empirical literature of both the existence and the common nature of a debt threshold across countries.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the next section discusses the existing literature on debt and growth, with Section 3 providing the theoretical background for my econometric approach. Section 4 introduces the data and describes the debt-growth nexus in each of the four OECD countries which are at the core of my analysis. Results for these and a larger set of countries are presented and discussed in Section 5, before Section 6 concludes.
Existing Literature
The existing empirical literature on the debt-growth nexus builds on somewhat ambiguous theoretical foundations (see Panizza and Presbitero, 2013 , for a recent survey). Some theoretical models argue that higher stocks of public debt may create increased uncertainty or even fear of future financial repression among investors and thus lead to a negative long-run relationship (Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999; Teles and Cesar Mussolini, 2014) between debt and growth. Other work main-tains that this negative relationship disappears once sticky wages and unemployment are taken into account in the modelling process (Greiner, 2011) . The nonlinearity or debt threshold hypothesised and investigated in most empirical work can be motivated for developing countries by pointing to the issue of debt overhang (Krugman, 1988; Sachs, 1989) , although it may be difficult to extend this argument to advanced economies such as those investigated in this paper. Nonlinearities may further arise if there is a tipping point of fiscal sustainability as is developed in Ghosh et al. (2013) , however I am not aware of any theoretical models incorporating such debt tipping points into a framework for economic growth over the long-run.
As was suggested above, the work by Reinhart and Rogoff (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009 , 2010a ,b, 2011 is largely descriptive in nature, although this should not distract from the significant contribution these authors have made to the literature in the construction of long data series for empirical analysis. Regression analysis of the debt-growth nexus conducted using panel data typically shares the unease about misspecification and endogeneity with the wider cross-country growth literature (see Durlauf, Johnson and Temple, 2005; Eberhardt and Teal, 2011 , for a discussion of the latter). Empirical specifications in this literature are across the board partial adjustment models in the mould of Barro (1991) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) -regressing growth on a lagged level of per capita GDP and a measure for debt stock as well as typically a large number of control variables -in a pooled model specification, thus assuming away the possibility of parameter heterogeneity across countries. 3 The standard practice in the cross-country literature to average data over three-or five-year intervals in the panel is also adopted in all but the most recent papers (Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2012; Baum, Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2013; Panizza and Presbitero, 2014) . Samples differ significantly across existing studies, with the work by Kumar and Woo (2010), Cecchetti, Mohanty and Zampolli (2011) , Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012), Baum, Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2013) and Panizza and Presbitero (2014) primarily focused on OECD and other high-income economies and thus most relevant to this study.
Among these OECD country studies the only one to adopt a polynomial specification is the paper by Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) , although this practice is popular in the study of developing economies (e.g. Cordella, Ricci and Ruiz-Arranz, 2010; Calderon and Fuentes, 2013; Presbitero, 2012) . With the exception of Cecchetti, Mohanty and Zampolli (2011) , who apply the within (fixed effects) estimator and thus cannot address concerns over reverse causality, all of the above empirical studies implement their panel analysis adopting the Blundell and Bond (1998) System GMM estimator originally developed for firm-level panel data analysis. 4
Despite different sample periods, country coverage, control variables, modelling of the nonlinearity and choice of moment conditions for identification, these studies come to remarkably similar conclusions, namely that beyond a threshold at around 90% debt-to-GDP the relationship between debt and growth is negative significant. However, as demonstrated by Panizza and Presbitero (2013) , these findings are either not robust to small changes in the sample, suggesting the results are driven by outliers, or fail to formally test the coefficients on the pairwise linear terms, which on closer inspection typically cannot support the notion of a statistically significant change in the debt coefficient above the threshold.
All of the above studies are focused on pooled panel data modelling, implicitly assuming that the long-run equilibrium relationship between debt and growth is the same for all countries in the sample. Existing research has found very different results when moving away from full sample analysis in homogeneous parameter regression models and toward sub-sample analysis along geographic, institutional or income lines (International Monetary Fund, 2012; Kourtellos, Stengos and Tan, 2013; Eberhardt and Presbitero, 2015) . There are a number of reasons to assume the equilibrium relationship between debt and growth could differ across countries. Vulnerability to public debt depends not only on debt levels, but also on debt composition (Inter-American Development Bank, 2006) . Unfortunately, existing data for the analysis of debt and development often represent a mix of information relating to general and central government debt, debt in different currency denominations and with different terms attached (be they explicit or implicit). All of this implies that comparability of the debt data across countries may be compromised (Panizza and Presbitero, 2013) . In addition, even assuming that debt stocks are comparable across countries and over time, the possible effect of public debt on GDP may depend on the reason why debt has been accumulated and on whether it has been consumed or invested (and in the latter case in which economic activities). Furthermore, different stocks of debt may impinge differently on economic growth: debt can clearly hinder GDP growth when it becomes unsustainable, affecting interest rates and triggering a financial crisis, thus affecting the level of GDP. However, the capacity to tolerate high debts depends on a number of country-specific characteristics, related to past crises and the macro and institutional framework (Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano, 2003; Kraay and Nehru, 2006; Manasse and Roubini, 2009) . For these reasons the focus of analysis in this paper is on country-by-country investigation of the long-run relationship between debt and growth.
A recent study which empirically investigates the debt-growth nexus with a time series econometric approach is the paper by Balassone, Francese and Pace (2011 ) on Italy (1861 . Adopting unit root and cointegration testing prior to estimation they establish a long-run relationship between per capita GDP, per capita capital stock and debt-to-GDP ratio (all in logarithms). They then go on to estimate (among other models) a piecewise linear specification for the debt-to-GDP ratio where values beyond a threshold of 100% are found to create a significantly stronger negative effect on growth -it is precisely this form of interaction between a threshold dummy and the debt-to-GDP ratio which is not defined under (linear) cointegration and which necessitates the present analysis. 5 It should also be noted that cointegration does not imply causation from debt to growth.
Nonlinear Relations between Integrated Processes

Methodology
In this section I highlight the difficulties arising for conventional time series analysis when assuming a non-linear model in the presence of integrated variables and discuss a novel approach to tackle these issues.
Suppose a time series relationship y t = f (x t , θ) + u t for a nonstationary regressor x t ∼ I(1), stationary u t and some non-linear function f (·). Assuming for illustration f (x t ) = θ 1 x t + θ 2 x 2 t , 5 Adopting the threshold specification I find that in my data series for Italy none of the various thresholds adopted pass the co-summability test (100% threshold CI low 0.313,δê t =1.134, CI up 1.954; 90% CI low 0.486,δê t = 1.052, CI up 1.619; 70% CI low 0.910,δê t = 1.695, CI up 2.480; 50% CI low 0.811,δê t = 1.471, CI up 2.130) -see results section for notation. 7 let x t = x t−1 + x 0 + ε t and ε t ∼ i.i.d.(0, σ 2 ε ), then we know that
In words, it can be shown that the Engle and Granger (1987, henceforth EG) characterisation of a stationary process holds for ∆x t -finite variance is one of five EG characteristics. Now investigate the same property for ∆x 2 t :
Here the finite variance characteristic is clearly violated, given that the variance is a function of time. Since this problem cannot be solved by further differencing it is not possible to determine the order of integration of x 2 t . This in turn creates fundamental problems if the empirical analysis of y t = θ 1 x t +θ 2 x 2 t +u t is to be based on arguments of cointegration. The difficulty arises from the requirement of the EG characterisation to investigate the differences of a process, with the intrinsic linearity of the difference operator creating obvious problems for nonlinear processes.
The following briefly introduces a novel set of methods for nonlinear processes which closely resemble the standard toolkit in linear time series analysis (tests for unit root behaviour and cointegration). The motivation for these new methods is to create "a summary measure of the stochastic properties -such as persistence -of the time series without relying on linear structures" (Berenguer-Rico and Gonzalo, 2014b, 3) . The implementation of these tests is straightforward, involving OLS regressions of transformed variable series, where transformations avoid the first differencing so central to Dickey-Fuller-type unit root analysis and instead build on running sums.
Like in the case of unit root analysis the distributions of these test statistics are non-standard, but estimates for sub-samples can be used to create confidence intervals for inference.
Berenguer-Rico and Gonzalo (2014b) build on earlier work by Gonzalo and Pitarakis (2006) to develop a non-linear alternative to linear integration, based on the 'order of summability.' 6 The empirical procedure to determine the order of summability analyses the rate of convergence of a rescaled sum Y * k of the variable of interest y t . Using least squares we can estimate for k = 1, . . . , T
from which the estimate of the order of summabilityδ * = (β * − 1)/2 is obtained. Inference can be established using confidence intervals constructed from subsample estimation (Politis, Romano and Wolf, 1999) , whereby the above procedure is applied to
Summability is a more general concept than integration, but they are closely related: if a series
x t is integrated of order d, I(d) for d ≥ 0, then it is also summable of order d, S(d); however, not all S(d) processes are also I(d). Summability analysis thus provides important insights into the time series properties of a variable but in contrast to unit root analysis is not limited to linear processes. In the case of the debt-growth application I pursue here this allows me to investigate the time series properties of squared and cubed debt-to-GDP ratios as well as piecewise linear debt-to-GDP series.
In a second step, Berenguer-Rico and Gonzalo (2014a) offer a test to investigate the 'balance' of the empirical relationship, namely the condition that the two sides of the empirical equation have the same order of summability:
Again there is a close analogy with the linear unit root and cointegration case: before cointegration between two or more variables can be tested, it is necessary to establish that these variables possess the same order of integration. Regressing stationary on nonstationary variables -as would be the case if we regressed the per capita GDP growth rate on the debt-to-GDP ratio in levels -is referred to as an inconsistent regression which leads to invalid inference. However, in the present study I do not test for balance due to an unresolved problem with the testing procedure which invalidates the results. 9
7 The deterministic component m t can be accounted for by the partial mean of y t , namely m t = (1/t) t j=1 y j in case of a constant. Given the trending behaviour of my data I focus below on the case of constant and linear trend terms, where partial demeaning of y t is carried out twice. 8 I am grateful to a referee who emphasises that the validity of the subsampling procedure has only been shown by simulation. 9 A referee kindly pointed out that the properties of the balance statistic in a simple model of
It should be noted that the main arguments put forth in this paper are based on the co-summability tests, which do not suffer the same problem.
Finally, the concept of co-summability is tested by investigating the error terms of a candidate specification. In empirical practice, letê t be the least squares residuals from a balanced regression y t =θg(x t ) +ê t , then 'strong co-summability' will imply the order of summability ofê t is statistically close to zero, S(0) (Berenguer-Rico and Gonzalo, 2014a) . Note the analogy to a linear cointegrating relationship where the residuals from a linear regression between I(1) variables will be I(0). The order of summability forê t can be estimated to determine whether a candidate model is co-summable. 10 Inference follows the subsampling approach as in the previous testing procedures and under the null of co-summability the confidence interval includes zero. In Sweden the debt-to-GDP ratio only surpasses the 50 percent threshold in 15 sample years (7% of observations) so that I cannot investigate even a 50%
Specifications
x t ∼ S(δ) and u t ∼ S(δ), are badly affected by θ, especially when θ = 1. 10 The residual seriesê t will sum to zero by default of the least squares principle if our specification includes an intercept; in practice the estimate for the intercept term is therefore not subtracted when constructingê t . 11 Parts of the literature, including Baum, Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2013), employ threshold regression algorithms where the threshold value is determined endogenously. Extending the co-summability approach in a similar fashion is beyond the scope of this study. threshold for this country. Note that all of the empirical approaches in the debt-growth literature discussed above are based on models which are linear in parameters but non-linear in the variables -my implementation follows this assumption. Although there are of course alternative transformations (e.g. 'integrable functions' proposed by Park and Phillips, 2001) to model the potential nonlinearity in the debt-growth relationship I restrict myself to the above polynomial and threshold models since these feature in the vast majority of empirical applications -see Panizza and Presbitero (2013) for a recent survey.
The co-summability analysis thus investigates a number of specifications for the debt-growth relationship, inspired by the simple Reinhart and Rogoff (2010b) setup. The polynomial specifications are:
where y is per capita GDP and x is the debt-to-GDP ratio (both in logarithms), α 0 is an intercept, t a linear trend term with parameter ϕ and ε t is white noise.
The threshold model specifications are based on
is an indicator function which is 1 for the debt-to-GDP ratio X t below the threshold and 0 otherwise -similarly for 1(X t ≥ threshold) at and above the threshold.
I investigate the evidence for long-run equilibrium relationships between debt burden and per capita GDP levels -since the focus of the applied literature is on the long-run relationship I adopt the levels variable for income, rather than its growth rate. The popularity of the 'growth' specification in the cross-country empirical literature is justified by the presence of the lagged level of per capita GDP as additional regressor (as is the case for the 'debt-growth' analysis of Kumar and Woo, 2010; Cecchetti, Mohanty and Zampolli, 2011; Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2012; Baum, Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2013, among others) . This quasi-error correction specification provides estimates for a long-run levels relationship although researchers frequently refer to this type of specification as a 'growth' equation (see Eberhardt and Teal, 2011) .
In addition to the analysis for the full time horizon I investigate co-summability in the four OECD countries using a window of sixty years, which is moved along the time horizon from the 1800s to 2010. The purpose of this exercise is to provide both an indication of possible changes in the long-run debt-growth relationship over time as well as to safeguard the analysis from undue impact of severe shocks such as the two world wars or changes in the definition or the debt variable. 12 Due to the nature of the data this approach is only feasible for the polynomial specifications: as highlighted by Chinn (2012) in his review of Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) there are comparatively few episodes in developed economies where the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 90% and I can therefore not implement the moving window for the piecewise linear specification. Since this rolling window analysis represents a form of data mining I adjust the confidence intervals (CI) for all estimates following a standard Bonferroni correction, whereby CI * = (1 − α/m) for the conventional confidence level 1 − α (I adopt α = .05) and the number of sub-samples tested m (varies from 80 for Japan to 152 for the US, Great Britain and Sweden). In practice this makes the confidence intervals much wider, thus representing a more conservative approach to rejecting the null hypothesis of cosummability. A number of additional robustness checks are carried out, for which the motivation, approach, and results are presented in an Online Appendix. The focus of these robustness checks is on (i) a diverse sample of 23 additional economies (including some developing countries); (ii) a reverse specification with debt-to-GDP ratio (in logs) as the dependent variable for models including the (log of) per capita GDP, and its squared and cubed polynomial terms as regressors; (iii) economic theory-based specifications which add a number of determinants of growth as favoured by the cross-country growth literature to the model. 12 The data used here refer to central government debt, which excludes any debt from local government, as opposed to general government debt. As shown in the work of Dippelsman, Dziobek and Mangas (2012) , the quantitative implications of this choice of variable can be stark. However, in the absence of any general government debt data over the long time horizon the analysis here is forced to employ the conceptually inferior 'central government' measuresthis choice is however aligned with the analysis in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010b) .
Data
I use annual per capita GDP (in 1990 Geary-Khamis $) from an updated version (Bolt and van Zanden, 2013) of the series compiled by Maddison (2010) . I match these data to information on the gross government debt-to-GDP ratio (in percent) from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) . The debt figures refer to total gross central government debt, comprising domestic and external debt (see Online Appendix for exceptions). Data coverage differs across countries: for the US, Britain and Sweden data series start in 1800, for Japan in 1872 -all series end in 2010.
Descriptive statistics for these four countries are presented in the Online Appendix, where I also plot the levels and first differences of the per capita GDP and debt-to-GDP ratio variables (in logs).
Although my summability analysis provides insights into the time series properties of these data I also carry out a number of unit root tests to illustrate the difference in order of integration between the per capita GDP growth rate and the debt-to-GDP ratio in levels which rules out the existence of any long-run relationship (cointegration, co-summability) between these two variable series.
In the Online Appendix data from a further 23 countries using the same sources are employed to carry out summability and co-summability tests. Here countries were included in the sample provided their per capita GDP and debt-to-GDP ratio series extended back to 1900 or earlier.
Extended empirical models analysed in an Online Appendix incorporate inflation and schooling data primarily taken from the Clio Infra project at the International Institute of Social History, population data from the original Maddison (2010) dataset, investment and additional debt data from Maddison (1992) , Mitchell (2007a,b) , and the World Bank World Development Indicators as well as a number of other sources (for details see Online Appendix). In Figure 2 I plot the debt-income relationship in each of the four countries, taking variables in deviation from the country-specific time-series mean. In all four economies the most significant turning points for the debt-growth nexus were marked by the Great War of 1914-18, the Great Recession of the late 1920s and World War II. Table 1 provides estimates of the order of summability for all model variables, including polynomial as well as threshold terms for debt. None of the confidence intervals for tests on per capita GDP levels or any of the debt variables include zero, thus rejecting the null of summability of order zero. The estimated order of summability for the per capita GDP growth rates in contrast is always very close to zero. For the linear terms of per capita GDP and the debt-to-GDP ratio (in logs or levels) and their growth rates these results are perfectly in line with unit root and stationarity test results presented in the Online Appendix, where I establish stationary growth rates and nonstationary levels series (whether in logarithms or not).
Empirical Results
Main results: Order of Summability
These findings highlight the significant persistence in the data and provide a strong motivation for the concerns over time series properties I argue are of primary importance when analysing the long-run debt-growth nexus. In analogy to integrated data, we run the risk of spurious results in any regressions containing these variables unless we can confirm our empirical models as balanced and co-summable. Note that with the exception of the study by Balassone, Francese and Pace (2011) on Italy none of the papers in this literature show concern for time series properties of the data. Table 2 provides results from co-summability tests using per capita GDP levels as dependent variable. Co-summability is rejected in all countries and specifications -residuals from these models were not found to be summable of order zero, S(0). Note that the rejection of co-summability is by no means marginal, with all confidence intervals some distance away from zero. The fact that sub-sampling confidence intervals are at times very wide is a further strong signal for misspecification.
Main results: Co-Summability
These findings imply that from a long-run perspective per capita income and the debt-to-GDP ratio do not move together, precluding any causal relationship between these variables. 13 
Results from Subsample Analysis
Subsample analysis yields three sets of results: (i) country-specific time-varying co-summability statistics for the entire 152 subsamples (80 for Japan) of sixty years, which I present in graphical form; (ii) comparison of the co-summability subsample results for the United States, Great Britain and Sweden, again in graphical form -this is intended to uncover patterns of commonality and difference in the equilibrium relationship across countries; (iii) co-summability statistics for the post-WWII period as well as results omitting the most recent years covering the global financial crisis (2008) (2009) (2010) .
Graphical results for the sub-sample analysis of co-summability, including Bonferroni-adjusted confidence intervals, are presented in Figure 3 . 14 In each plot the end-year of the sixty-year window of analysis is marked on the x-axis and shading indicates the Bonferroni-adjusted 95% confidence intervals -due to different data availability this time dimension of the plots differ for Japan. Note first that across all models and countries the confidence intervals are fairly large, typically from 0 to 2 or larger. Second, while (Japan aside) in each country the share of samples which satisfy cosummability is typically above 50%, 15 this data property does not appear to be satisfied consistently over longer stretches of time, but instead appears sporadically. Both of these findings provide a strong signal of misspecification and thus echo the full sample results presented above.
In Table 3 I Referring back to Figure 2 it can be seen that the first of these clusters, covering subsamples ending in the 1860s, occurred when all three countries substantially reduced their country-specific debtburden (movement to the left in Figure 2 ) albeit with comparatively modest increase in growth in the US and Sweden (relatively flat line plots). No such pattern is revealed for the second cluster for subsamples ending in the 1890s and 1900s, while the third cluster with end years in the 1950s and 60s occurred when all three countries shifted from a relative debt build-up in years prior to and during WWII to significant debt reduction thereafter, whereby the latter period also represented a return to steady economic growth. The final cluster in the early 2000s again does not reveal any systematic patterns in the evolution of debt burden and growth across these three economies.
Inbetween these episodes there are stretches where two countries have co-summable specifications (around 31-38% of subsamples in each model), although these are often clustered around the episodes just described. The remainder of subsamples is made up of single country episodes (20-34% in each model) and subsamples with no co-summability in any country (7-16% in each model). Table 4 then zooms in on the post-WWII period which forms the focal point for virtually all existing empirical studies on the debt-growth nexus. Here we find some evidence for co-summability in nonlinear specifications (these sub-samples are shaded in grey), especially for the model including a cubed term. Note however that the confidence intervals for the overwhelming majority of these results are very large (indicated with the darker shading), such that they include 1 and at times even 2: a large confidence interval is indicative of serious misspecification and these findings of co-summability should thus be treated with caution. 16 In Model 1 they make up 17% of all subsamples, in Models 2 and 3 30% and 36% respectively. The solid black line represents the computed Co-Summability statistic. I allow for an intercept in the co-summability analysis. The coverage of the data differs across countries:
for the US, Great Britain and Sweden I have data from 1800-2010 (152 subsamples), for Japan from 1872-2010 (80 subsamples). Model 1 refers to a specification with linear debt terms only, Model 2 to a specification with linear and quadratic debt terms, Model 3 further includes a cubed debt term. 
Notes:
Increasing shading indicates the number (0-3) of countries for which the sixty-year subsample ending in the year indicated has a co-summable specification.
These robustness checks provide a number of important insights: first, there is no overwhelming evidence that these full sample results are severely distorted by global shocks or structural breaks in the long-run debt-growth relationship, given that a very considerable share of subsamples were found to not to be co-summable across all countries and specifications. Second, having said that my results point to a distinct possibility that certain countries experienced linear or nonlinear comovement between debt and income during certain periods of time over the past two centuries, although seemingly much less so during the 20th century.
Concluding Remarks
This study took an alternative approach to investigating the presence of nonlinearities in the longrun equilibrium relation between public debt and growth. Empirical results for four OECD countries using data from 1800 to 2010 and the various robustness checks carried out provide limited evidence for nonlinear, or indeed linear, long-run relationships between these variables. There are however certain subperiods over this long time horizon for which tests confirm co-movement between debt and income. The timing of these subperiods of co-movement frequently appears to differ across countries. These findings are not narrowly confined to the four OECD economies studied in detail but seem to have much wider validity, and further are not an artefact of the simple model specification adopted: I investigated summability and co-summability in a sample of 23 additional countries (including some developing countries), and furthermore studied a number of theory-based extended specifications for the four OECD economies; results in the Online Appendix provide strong support for the findings presented above. Notes: This table presents results for sub-sample co-summability testing. Model (M ) 1-3 refer to the following specifications: 1 -linear, 2 -linear and squared, 3 -linear, squared and cubed debt/GDP terms (in logs). In each case I report statistics from the sixty-year samples, with start and end years as indicated in the table, focusing on the period after 1945. Shaded cells indicate sub-samples where the co-summability confidence interval includes zeronote however that these confidence intervals are at times very large, such that they further include 1 and at times even 2 (the latter options are represented by darker shading). See Table 2 for all other details.
It is important to emphasise that this study does not and cannot address causality from high(er) debt to low(er) growth as has been the focus in most of the empirical work on this topic. This is by no means a shortcoming of the approach taken. Instead, it highlights a central inconsistency in the empirical analysis of nonlinearities in the debt-growth relationship in the existing literature: in order to establish a long-run causal relationship from debt to growth, it is necessary to first establish a long-run equilibrium relationship. This study documents the difficulties for establishing the latter using standard empirical specifications adopted in the literature when variable series are integrated.
Once these difficulties are addressed, I find no evidence for a long-run equilibrium relation in the data for four OECD countries. Various robustness checks provide assurance that this finding is not an artefact of sample selection. Since a long-run equilibrium relationship represents a pre-requisite for any long-run causality between variables my analysis by necessity stops at this point.
The results presented in this paper undermine some of the popular conclusions for this politicallycharged issue which represent fiscal adjustment as a necessity for long-run economic stability and sustainability. I do not claim that a high debt burden is a matter of no concern for policymakers or that in the short-run debt may not be detrimental to growth. Instead, I highlight the absence of evidence for nonlinearities such as the popular 90% debt-to-GDP threshold or polynomial spec- Human Capital Average years of education in the population is taken from the Excel spreadsheets provided by the Clio Infra project at www.clio-infra.eu.
A.2 Descriptives and Data Properties
Descriptive statistics for the four OECD countries analysed in the maintext are presented in Table   A -1. Table A -2 reports results from unit root tests for all linear processes. This indicates that growth rates of per capita GDP or debt-to-GDP are stationary, while the levels of these variables are nonstationary. Figure A-1 charts the log levels and growth rates of per capita GDP (left column) and the debt-to-GDP ratio (right column) in the four sample countries.
-iv - Notes: I provide the descriptive statistics for the levels variables included in our analysis (all in logarithms as indicated). Gap reports the number of missing observations. ∆ is the difference operator. USA ln(GDP pc) 1800 2010 9 -0.88 0.65 0.47 * * * 2.27 * * * (Debt/GDP) 13 -2.55 -1.03 0.11 1.66 * * * ln(Debt/GDP) 6 -2.38 -2.27 0.08 1.06 * * * ∆ln(GDP pc) 1801 2010 8 -6.17 * * * -11.29 * * * 0.03 0.14 ∆ln(Debt/GDP) 5 -6.31 * * * -10.54 * * * 0.03 0.04 GBR ln(GDP pc) 1800 2010 6 0.09 2.26 0.66 * * * 3.07 * * * (Debt/GDP) 6 -1.89 -1.64 0.34 * * * 0.94 * * * ln(Debt/GDP) 1 -2.12 -1.66 0.93 * * * 2.64 * * * ∆ln(GDP pc) 1801 2010 8 -6.41 * * * -12.70 * * * 0.03 0.52 * * * ∆ln(Debt/GDP) 14 -2.08 -7.00 * * * 0.08 0.10 SWE ln(GDP pc) 1800 2010 10 -0.48 2.71 0.55 * * * 1.99 * * * (Debt/GDP) 10 -2.16 -1.95 0.12 * 1.37 * * * ln(Debt/GDP) 10 -1.66 -1.34 0.10 1.44 * * * ∆ln(GDP pc) 1801 2010 9 -3.29 * * -13.59 * * * 0.14 * 0.83 * * * ∆ln(Debt/GDP) 9 -3.35 * * -11.25 * * * 0. Notes: These plots chart the evolution of per capita GDP (in logs, left column) and the debt/GDP ratio (in logs, right column) for our four OECD countries. In each plot the levels variable (left axis, dashed line) is graphed alongside the variable in first differences (right axis, gray bars). Note that the per capita GDP growth series for Japan (-68%) excludes 1945 for ease of illustration. extend the empirical model to include a number of determinants of growth as favoured by the cross-country growth literature. The following specifications are tested (obviously debt terms are always included): (i) I add inflation to the model, motivated by theoretical considerations of an investment-enhancing 'Tobin effect' of inflation as well as its reverse, and the strong negative impact found in cross-country empirical work (e.g. Barro, 1991) ; (ii) I analyse a 'Solow Model with Debt,' which includes the investment-to-GDP ratio (in logs) as well as the population growth rate and is motivated by the empirical equilibrium analysis of a standard Solow growth model in Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992, equation (7) and Table I ); (iii) I extend this to the 'Augmented Solow Model with Debt' by adding a measure of human capital (schooling) which was shown by the same authors to reconcile empirical estimates with observed income shares of capital and labour (equation (12) and Table II of that paper).
Summability test results for the new variables included are provided in Table A -7 . Results here are not necessarily consistent across countries, in particular with regard to the population variable: the slow pace of demographic transition in advanced economies such as those studied here typically translates into the time series of this variable (in logarithms) appearing to be integrated of order two, I(2), with the growth rate thus I(1). This is the case for Sweden and Great Britain, where S(0) and thus I(0) is rejected, however the population growth rates for the United States and Japan cannot reject this property. There are also minor disagreements across countries with regards to the inflation and investment share (in logs). Table A -8 reports co-summability results from a model where inflation is added as additional regressor to the debt term(s). This setup is found to be co-summable across all models for Great Britain but not in any other country bar the threshold specification for the United States. The 'Solow Model with Debt' then finds all models for Sweden and Japan co-summable but none for the United States (again with the same exception of the 50% debt/GDP threshold) and Great Britain -see Table A -9. Finally, the 'Augmented Solow Model with Debt' in Table A -10 again finds all models for Sweden co-summable, yet none for the other countries, with the exception of the model with linear and squared debt terms for the United States and the two polynomial specifications for Great Britain.
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